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AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO THE
VALUATION OF WORKS OF ART
DESTROYED WHILE ON CONSIGNMENT
IN ILLINOIS GALLERIES PATRICIA A. FELCH'
INTRODUCTION
In February and April of 1989, a sprinkler system
caused a small flood, and two fires occurred in a
warehouse full of art galleries on Superior and Huron
Streets in the River North area of Chicago. A renova-
tion of the building was in progress. A small portion
of one gallery's collection was sent to a conservator
following the February flood and was not in the
building at the time of the fires. The second fire raged
overnight on April 15-16, 1989, destroying the build-
ing and most of its contents, but approximately 4,000
artworks were recovered from the ashes and there-
after sent to a storage facility where they remain
today.
A lawsuit consolidating over twenty cases is now
pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County,2 and
two lawsuits have been filed in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.3 In
the Cook County case, galleries are suing the con-
struction companies involved in the renovations;
artists are suing the galleries and construction compa-
nies; one man who was injured during the fire is
suing the construction companies; and insurers are
suing to recover payments made to various aggrieved
parties or to determine which company should be
responsible for paying which claims. In the federal
court cases, artists are suing galleries.
Scores of artists have not yet filed suit.4 Although
a number of artists settled with gallery owners outside
the litigation, the claims in the Cook County case
alone exceed $34 million.
The cause of the April 15-16, 1989 fire remains
unknown, despite years of discovery, expert analyses
and a Chicago Fire Department report suggesting that
arson was not involved. Thus, it will be up to a Cook
County jury to decide who was to blame for the fire.
Even more vexing than the liability issue, howev-
er, is the quantification of the amount of damages that
the "liable" party or parties will be called upon to
pay. Galleries are claiming damages not only for their
lost furnishings, equipment and business opportuni-
ties, but also for the loss of their inventories-the art.
Some of the artworks were purchased outright by the
galleries or their owners, but most of the art was on
consignment, i.e., in possession of the galleries for
the purpose of being sold. The artists, therefore, have
competing claims to damages for their lost artworks.
Only the insurers' subrogation claims are undisputed,
since the sums they paid are certain.
The main problem in the River North cases, thus,
is how to evaluate the damaged or destroyed art-
works in order to compensate the galleries and artists
for their losses. Are the artworks that were damaged
during the flood or were recovered from the ashes
salvageable? Unlike the valuation of fungible goods
in comparison with readily available sources, estab-
lishing the value of a destroyed artwork which may
have been unique is problematical and often subjec-
tive.
Artworks are not priced for sale merely on the
cost basis of the materials used by the artist to create
them. Rather, the artist and gallery agree on a rather
subjective evaluation of what the market can bear, or
what a reasonable buyer of artworks might pay for a
piece. That list price is determined at the time of con-
signment, but may change over the years that an art-
work remains in the gallery's collection or as an artist
becomes recognized so that his or her artworks are in
demand. Some artists enjoy regular and repeated
sales, while others may not see their works sold until
the gallery mounts an exhibit spotlighting their art.
The fair market value of a damaged or destroyed
artwork is very difficult to ascertain. Determining the
aggregate amount of damages in the River North
cases, thus, presents an awesome challenge. Lengthy
testimony by the artists, the gallery owners and even
experts could be necessary to verify value. However,
unlike situations involving existing works of art, the
artworks in the River North case are either gone or in
such damaged condition that art appraiserb might not
be able to provide adequate assistance to the courts
on evaluating the losses.
Adding to that dilemma is the fact that galleries
and artists usually share in the proceeds from a sale
of a consigned artwork. The gallery retains a percent-
age of the gross sale price as a sales commission,
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sometimes subtracting additional charges called "dis-
counts" if the artworks are sold through other dealers
or to collectors requiring discounts. The gallery is
then supposed to pay the artist the balance.
Thus, the galleries involved in the River North
case could assert claims to a commission-percentage
of the values established for the lost artworks. Artists,
on the other hand, could be entitled to full compen-
sation for their losses since they did not receive any
benefit from the gallery's consignment.
Few legal authorities exist on the very complex
concept of art valuation, especially in the context of
destruction while on consignment. No writers have
yet proposed a mathematical model on which art val-
uations could be made. Accordingly, this article
attempts to establish both a legal basis and an objec-
tive framework for evaluating works of art that have
been damaged or destroyed while consigned to
Illinois galleries.
LEGAL AUTHORITIES
ON ART VALUATION
Only one reported opinion specifically addresses
art valuation in the context of destruction during a
gallery fire.' That case construes the California
Consignment of Art Act. The Illinois Consignment of
Art Act7 has not yet been construed in reported opin-
ions by the courts.,
Internal Revenue Service regulations and Tax
Court decisions provide some guidance regarding val-
uation of art in the context of charitable contribution
deductions and estate tax returns. General measure-
of-damages cases in Illinois provide additional
approaches to the valuation of damaged or destroyed
personal property, but do not address the unique
properties and valuation characteristics of artworks.
Nonetheless, the existing authorities offer a legal
basis not only for measuring the damages applicable
to the artworks lost in the River North fire, but also
for what types of evidence are sufficient to quantify
such damages. The evidence then can be transformed
through mathematical formulae into actual damages
quantifications. See, Formulae For Establishing
Valuation Of Damaged or Destroyed Artworks, below.
Pelletier v. Eisenberg
The Pelletier opinion is the only existing ruling on
valuation of artworks destroyed during a gallery fire9
In that case, the jury awarded the artist $21,689 (for
the fair market value at the time of destruction of nine
paintings destroyed in the gallery fire), $2,816 (for
future income losses attributable to the lost potential
for sales of the nine paintings), $42,500 (for time and
monies spent by the artist in pursuit of insurance pro-
ceeds withheld by the gallery owner), and pre-judg-
ment interest on the insurance proceeds.'0
On appeal of cross-motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict or for a new trial, the California
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to
conduct a new trial on damages incurred by the artist
because of the alleged conversion of the insurance
proceeds by the gallery owner." The court, however,
affirmed the jury's verdict as to both types of damages
awarded to the artist for the lost paintings-fair mar-
ket value and future losses.
With regard to the loss-of-artwork damages, the
defendant gallery owner argued on appeal that the
"fair market value" and "future losses" amounts
awarded by the jury to the artist should be reduced
by the commissions the gallery was due. The court
disagreed, citing specific provisions of the California
Consignment of Art Act.'2
The Pelletier court found that the California Act
defines a consignee as a trustee of the artworks for
the benefit of the artist.3 The Act also precludes con-
signees from reducing their exposure to fiduciary lia-
bility to consignors through contracts." Accordingly,
the court found the gallery owner to be strictly liable
for damages to or destruction of consigned artworks.
Additionally, the Pelletiercourt found that the typ-
ical consignment agreement between the artist and
gallery contemplated the sharing of revenues only
from sales of artworks, not from the destruction of
them. Here the artist was denied his benefit of the
consignment bargain. He suffered not only the loss of
potential sales, but also an accompanying deleterious
effect on the expected increase in his reputation from
future sales. The gallery owner should pay what the
jury awarded-both the total fair market value of the
artworks at the time of destruction and a rationally
derived figure for future sales losses, without subtract-
ing the gallery owner's commission percentage.'"
The Illinois Consignment of Art Act
Illinois' Consignment of Art Act includes provi-
sions substantially identical to California's statute.' 7
Additionally, the Illinois Act expressly provides that
the consignee/gallery will be strictly liable to the artist
for damages to or destruction of consigned artworks."'
Clearly, the purpose of a consignment of art agree-
ment is the same in Illinois as it is in California.
The only difference between the California and
Illinois statutes is the Illinois limitation on the artist's
reimbursement if a consigned artwork is damaged or
destroyed.'9 In Section 2(5), the Illinois Act provides
that the artist's recovery in such a situation is limited
to what s/he would have received if the artwork had
been sold.20
That limitation applies, however, only when a
valid consignment contract exists between the artist
and the consignee, as described in Section 1405 of
the Illinois Act.2' That Section requires a written con-
signment contract which must include at least five
provisions: (1) the value of the artwork consigned; (2)
the time within which proceeds of sales are to be
paid by the consignee to the artist; (3) the commis-
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sion percentage the consignee will be due upon the
sale of the artwork consigned; (4) the minimum price
for which the artwork can be sold; and (5) a descrip-
tion of discounts, if any, that will be applied by the
consignee to such sales.
If a consignee fails to comply with the contract
provisions of the Illinois Act, of course, the consignee
cannot invoke the limitation-of-damages provision.
Section 1405(3), in fact, permits the artist to seek the
assistance of the courts in having the artist's "obliga-
tions" voided. An artist's only obligation under the Act
is to pay the gallery commissions. Therefore, it is
clear that an artist, whose works are destroyed while
in constructive trust to a consignee/gallery that has
not complied with the Act, is entitled to full recov-
ery.Y The voiding of the artist's obligations, thus, ren-
ders the gallery strictly liable for both the fair market
value of and future losses reasonably expected from
the artist's works.
Illinois Legal Authorities on Valuation of
Fungible Goods
As did the Pelletier court, Illinois authorities estab-
lish the initial measure of damages for destroyed per-
sonal property as the fair market value of the proper-
ty. For example, the Seventh Circuit has held:
[Tlhe owner of destroyed goods is enti-
tled to be put in as good a position
pecuniarily as if his property had not
been destroyed and that the proper crite-
rion to be used in measuring damages is
the value of the thing destroyed. Wheth-
er the goods are totally destroyed or are
only damaged, the fair market value is
nonetheless the proper measure... 1
Illinois courts follow the fair-market-value rule for
damages to fungible goods, adding that the fair mar-
ket value should be measured at the time just imme-
diately prior to destruction. 21 In such cases, the fol-
lowing indicia of value have been permitted as evi-
dence of the fair market value of the damaged goods:
salvage income, plus the cost of salvaging; catalog
prices, plus lost profits; reasonable prices that a con-
sumer would pay; insurance coverage appraisals; and
tax depreciation schedules
In the River North cases involving destroyed art-
works, however, salvage and appraisals are not possi-
ble.2 1 Some artists were prominent enough to have
had catalogs with prices of their artworks, but tax
schedules are not available for specific artworks lost
in a fire. More importantly, artworks are unique, non-
fungible goods and thus, cannot be evaluated from
publicly available pricing data for "similar" goods.
Illinois Legal Authorities
on Valuation of Unique Goods
Illinois authorities support the award of some-
thing more than mere fair market value when the
destroyed property is unique or of special personal
value to the owner.26
In Jensen v. Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad
Co., a case involving antique railroad cars, the court
found that the property to be valued was not "an
ordinary object of commerce" and was so unique that
it "may not be susceptible to the general measure of
damages." In such instances, the property's value
must be ascertained "from such elements as are
attainable."v The proper basis for determining com-
pensatory damages to a "unique" piece of personal
property is its actual value to the plaintiff/owner. 1
In jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Inc., the court
was faced with evaluating damages due to a dog
owner. Following a rationale similar to the Jensen
court's, the Jankoski court found that "the plaintiff is
entitled to demonstrate [the dog's] value to him by
such proof as the circumstances admit.'2
At a minimum, the language from these two opin-
ions suggests that an artist's own valuations of unique
personal property should be considered and given
weight in measuring damages. Thus, to quantify the
fair market value of the artworks at the time of the
River North fire, the list prices stated by each artist are
reasonable and proper values at which to begin an
evaluation inquiry. It stands to reason that an artist
will sell no works if they are over-priced. Artists,
therefore, will seek only what the market can bear,
given the artists' own impressions of the value of their
artworks-a subjective evaluation on the basis of
medium, style, prior market experience, reputation,
etc.
In Gannon v. Freeman, the court held that "the
law does not require the plaintiff to prove the exact
amount of his loss; it is sufficient that the evidence
provide a basis for assessing damages with a fair
degree of probability."-° The court found that the orig-
inal cost of a vintage automobile, the cost of the parts
plaintiff purchased to restore it, and the time plaintiff
spent on its restoration were sufficient indicia of value
for the destroyed car.
Unfortunately, those indicia do not apply to art-
works. Especially when an artwork was never sold
prior to its being consigned, no cost basis will exist.
Also, the value of an artwork does not necessarily
reflect the cost of its materials and the time it took the
artist to create it. As mentioned above, the value of
an artwork is subjective, based on a combination of
the artist's, gallery owner's and art buyer's impres-
sions of what it is worth.
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Internal Revenue Service
Regulations And Tax Opinions
Treasury Regulations define fair market value as
"the price at which the property would change hands
between ha willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both
having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.""
The same rule is found in the estate tax regulations. 2
The estate tax regulations provide additionally that
the fair market value of an item of personal property
is to be determined in the market where such items
are "most commonly sold to the public."33
These definitions imply that personal property
must be evaluated in the context of its own specific,
ultimately efficient marketplace. The marketplace is
where the appropriate consumers would purchase the
property at retail prices." The most appropriate com-
parable market for valuation purposes is the most
active retail marketplace for the particular item
involved.3 The appropriate retail price is the best and
lowest that the consumer actually would have had to
pay-
6
In Biagiotti v. Commissioner, the Tax Court was
concerned with Pre-Columbian artworks imported
from South America. The tax payer purchased the art-
works over a period of years, held them for the statu-
torily required periods and then donated them to a
museum. The Internal Revenue Service claimed that
the tax payer's valuations of the donated artworks
were inflated.
In resolving the "battle of the experts" which is
typical of tax court disputes over art valuation, the
Tax Court found evidence of auction sales incompe-
tent.37 Comparable sales in the retail markets for Pre-
Columbian artworks, however, were both competent
and reliable. 8
In Anselmo v. Commissioner, the court was con-
cerned with a tax shelter in which poor quality, semi-
precious gems were imported from South America
and later donated to a museum at the prices they
would have received if set in costume jewelry. The
court relied on the complete definition of fair market
value established in the estate tax regulations, includ-
ing the example provided therein for automobiles
(the fair market value of an automobile is what a car
of similar age, make, model, condition and descrip-
tion would earn from a sale to the general public, not
what it would earn if sold to a used car dealer). The
court found the price at which a consumer could pur-
chase the stones at the time of donation to be their
fair market value.39
In the case of artworks consigned to a gallery, the
market for the artists' works is the art-buying public
who frequent the galleries to which the artworks
were consigned looking for artworks offered at retail
prices. Therefore, evidence of an artist's comparable
sales in other retail markets would be reliable for the
purpose of evaluating destroyed artworks.
Evidence of comparable sales has been used pri-
marily in the area of real property valuations. The
standards for valuing real property, however, are very
different from those for valuing personal property,
especially artworks.
40
The rule "is one of relevancy and not unlike the
general evidentiary rule applied in all proceedings
requiring similarity of conditions."4 The property
selected for comparison must be "similar in kind and
character."42
One of the few cases that deals with the compar-
isons of works of art involved a painting by Jean
Baptiste Camille Corot, a 19th century French paint-
er. 3 In Furstenberg v. United States, the tax payer had
donated a figure painting by Corot to a university. In
arguing against the Internal Revenue Service's imposi-
tion of a tax deficiency, the tax payer produced evi-
dence of the price at which another Corot figure
painting had just recently been sold to a collector.
The recent sales price was substantially higher than
the price the tax payer paid for her Corot figure paint-
ing.11
Initially, the Court found the scope of "compara-
bles" to have been properly limited by the experts.
Ninety-five percent of Corot's paintings had been
landscapes." His landscapes were extremely popular
in the 19th century, while his figure paintings were
almost unknown in that period. In the 20th century,
that situation reversed itself 6 Impliedly, a comparison
of sales of Corot landscapes with sales of Corot figure
paintings would not have been permitted.
The Furstenberg court, however, did not accept
the tax payer's argument that the recently sold Corot
figure painting was comparable. Relying on the
experts' testimony, the court found that the painting
at issue had been damaged by a negligent restoration
prior to its donation to the university and that it was
of inferior artistic quality compared to the high-priced
Corot." Given the tax payer's cost basis; the very high
price of the recently sold painting; the general quality
and condition of the tax payer's Corot; the potential
for its being restored properly; and the general
upward price trend in the retail art marketplace, the
court found the tax payer's Corot to be worth half
what she had reported, but substantially more than
what the Internal Revenue Service's panel of apprais-
ers estimated as its fair market value, which had been
less than her cost basis.
ANALYSIS
According to the above-cited authorities, the
artists whose artworks were destroyed while con-
signed to the River North galleries are entitled to the
fair market value of their artworks at the time of the
fire, plus an additional amount to compensate them
for future losses. 8 The problem, then, is how to calcu-
late those values.
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Fair market value at the time of the April, 1989
fire could be established through documentary evi-
dence, including consignment sheets or agreements
with the gallery owners on retail prices for each art-
work at the time it was consigned; up-dated price lists
or catalogs reflecting prices of the destroyed works
contemporaneous with the fire; or proof of prices
from sales of other comparable works around the
time of the fire. The artists' subjective valuations of
what prices would have applied to each artwork at
the time of the fire, however, are also reliable.
Future losses also could be established through
documentary evidence, including proof of prices from
recent sales of comparable works; recent consignment
sheets or agreements with gallery owners for compa-
rable works; recent price lists or catalogs reflecting
comparable works; or general inflation rates in the
retail art sales. An artist's estimate of what the same
artwork would sell for today is an excellent starting
place for evaluating future losses. A mere subtraction
of the earlier value from the later value, however,
would not provide a reasonable valuation of future
losses. An evaluation of future losses, therefore, could
be based on a particular artist's sales history with a
gallery, on the 13% figure established in Pelletier, or
on any data revealing how many comparable art-
works an artist sells each year.
To the extent an artist can provide sufficient infor-
mation, detailed computations based on mathematical
formulae will provide estimates of both fair-market-
value and future-losses amounts to a reasonable
degree of reliability. See, Formulae for Establishing
Valuation of Damaged or Destroyed Artworks, below.
Only if sufficient information is not available
would more evidence be needed. For example, an
artist's testimony could provide guidance especially
with regard to pricing practices depending on the
size, medium and date of an artwork. Additionally, art
appraisers or experts could offer opinions as to com-
parability, whether slides or catalog reproductions are
available for both the destroyed and recently sold
works, and on general inflation rates in retail art sales.
The simplest means of resolving the River North
artists' claims involving destroyed artworks would be
to accept the artists' estimates of fair market value and
future losses. The most time-consuming means would
be to require testimony of the artists and other
experts. The middle ground between the two
extremes might be to accept the artists' estimates after
having them calculate as best they can using the for-
mulae suggested below.
FORMULAE FOR ESTABLISHING
VALUATION OF DAMAGED OR DESTROYED
ARTWORKS
I. Fair market value
The following are valuation categories, ascertain-
able from various kinds of evidence, which could be
used to establish the fair market value of destroyed
artworks at the time of the April, 1989 fire:
A. Cost Basis ("CB"): The cost of materials,
plus a reasonable hourly rate for the artist's time
spent on creating the artwork; the most recent price
at which the artwork actually sold prior to the con-
signment; or the price of a comparable work sold
prior to consignment revealing the minimum fair mar-
ket value of a similar artwork prior to the time of con-
signment.
B. Prices quoted at time of consignment, or
Consignment Value ("CV"): Prices could appear in
consignment sheets, or have been quoted orally and
accepted by the gallery owner.
C. Price Lists or Guidelines at time of the
fire, or Price List Value ("PLV"): Some artists regu-
larly update their price lists, but most have size/sales
history guidelines that they use to establish pricing of
their artworks, along with reasonable increases.
D. Comparable Prices or Sales at time of the
fire, or Comparable Price ("CP"): Evidence of com-
parable prices or sales may be as specific as prices for
identical prints (in the case of multiples), but usually
will be based, of necessity, on substantial similarity of
works in the same style, size and medium.
E. Comparable Prices or Sales after the fire,
or Recent Value ("RV"): Price lists or sales records
for substantially similar works.
F. Expert Opinions: As a last resort, if none of
the above-described information is available, art valu-
ation experts and art appraisers can provide estimates
of fair market value and probabilities of sales, as well
as comparisons among comparable artists' works
within the same type of market place.
Cost Basis (CB), as indicated in the tax cases ana-
lyzed above, does not provide a reasonable basis for
evaluating the fair market value of an artwork unless
no other information is available. If only the Cost
Basis is known, an expert may be required to provide
a basis for extrapolating the minimum value of an art-
work to its fair market value at the time of the fire.
The Cost Basis, however, does suggest a minimum
value against which the other ascertainable figures
can be compared for reliability.
From the other categories of information describ-
ed above, the following calculations are possible (in
order of reliability) to establish fair market value at
the time of the fire:
If there is reliable documentary evidence only for
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Price List Value (PLV) or Comparable Price (CP), no
additional evidence or calculations should be neces-
sary. The Price List Value (PLV) or Comparable Price
(CP) is the fair market value, according to the legal
authorities cited above.
If there is reliable documentary evidence only for
Consignment Value (CV) and Recent Value (RV),
revealing a disparity between the two values, those
figures can be used to extrapolate fair market value at
the time of destruction. Statistical packages and
sophisticated calculators can perform an annual-per-
cent-of-increase (Ap) analysis through a "nth root" cal-
culation, by taking the root to the power of the num-
ber of years' difference (N) between two values (CV
and RV) of the figure reached from dividing the later
value (RV) by the earlier value (CV) to reach Ap. To
reach FMV at the time of destruction, add the original
CV to CV plus the Ap to reach the following year's
increased value (IV) for each year after consignment
until the year of the fire.
Formulae:
RV=A
CV + (V - Ap) =IV
IV] + (IVI * A p) = IV2
IV2 + (IV2 * Ap) IV 3, etc. until Ivn s i989
II. Future Losses
Future losses could be calculated simply by
applying the 13% figure established in Pelletier. On
the other hand, future losses could be specifically
related to a particular artist's dealings with a particular
gallery and calculated in a more complex manner.
The value of the complex calculation lies in its ability
to evaluate the history of an artist's sales from a par-
ticular gallery in relation to the value of the particular
collection consigned to that gallery, taking into con-
sideration that artist's percentage of estimated annual
increases in value.
The complex calculation would require a number
of separate calculations to determine future losses:
(1) determining the artist's percentage of annual
increase (Ap) calculated from any two years for which
collection values are available; (2) finding an average
of the artist's annual sales prior to the fire (S89),
either from the particular gallery or from comparable
markets; (3) using those figures to estimate total antic-
ipated sales for all years since the fire until the
gallery's collection would have been depleted (TS);
and (4) subtracting the fair market value of the whole
collection in 1989 (FMV89) from the total anticipated
sales (TS) to reach a figure for future losses (FL). If an
artist does not have data revealing a sales history with
the gallery, the same calculations can be performed,
but with a different means of approximating average
1989 sales (S89). See, Future Losses Without Sales
From The Gallery, below.
A. Percentage of Annual Increase (Ap)
Finding the artist's percentage of annual increase
(Ap) requires the same "nth root" calculation
described above: calculating the root to the power of
3 (representing the number of calendar years that
have passed since the April 15, 1989 fire) of what the
gallery's collection would have been worth currently
(V92), divided by fair market value of the collection in
1989 (FMV9) to equal the Ap.
Formula:
V 92
FMV89 =
B. Estimated Average Annual Sales
Finding an artist's estimated average sales for the
year of the fire (S89) requires a series of calculations,
each taking available sales figures for years prior to
the fire (S85, S86, S87, S88) and applying the percent-
age of annual increase (Ap) for all years through 1988,
to extrapolate a figure for estimated sales in 1989
(S89). To establish what the artist's average sales
would have been in 1989, average all of each prior
year's sales figures (S89yi, $89r2, S89y,3 through 1988,
S8988) and divide by the number of years for which
sales figures exist (N).
Formulae:
(assuming the availability of four years' worth of
sales figures from 1985 through 1988 and 1989
being the year of the fire):
S85 o Ap = S8685 °Ap = S8785 * Ap = S888s5 Ap = S89xs
S86 o Ap = S87s6 o Ap = S8886 * Ap = S896
S87 * Ap = S8887 Ap = S89s7
S88 * Ap = 88988
S8985 + S8986 + S8987 + S89ss + 4 = S89
C. Total Anticipated Sales
Once the estimated 1989 average sales figure
(S89) is established, a spread-sheet calculation pro-
gram or step-by-step manual calculations can be uti-
lized to subtract yearly sales from the collection of
artworks (FMV.) to reach each successive year's
remaining inventory (189, I90, I91, etc.). By applying the
percentage of annual increase (Ap) to each year's
remaining inventory, a fair market value for that
remaining inventory (FMV89, FMVgo, FMV9i, etc.) can
be reached. Then, by applying the percentage of
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annual increase (Ap) to the previous year's sales, that
year's estimated sales (S90, S91, S92, etc.) can be
reached and subtracted from each year's remaining
inventory at fair market value (FMV. until the collec-
tion of artworks in the gallery is depleted (when the
last remaining FMVx amount is less than the previous
year's sales). The sum of all yearly estimated sales
(S89, S90, S91, etc.) and the last FMV. amount equals
the total estimated sales (TS) for that artist, i.e., the
amount that would put the artist in the same position
s/he would have been in had the artworks not been
destroyed in the fire.
Formulae:
FMV6 - S89 = Isg e AP = F.MVgo - (S89 • Ap = S90) = 19o
A FMV.i - (S90 - Ap = S91) * Ap = Igi o Ap = FMV92 -
(S91 Ap = S92) - Ap = 192 e Ap = FMV93, etc. until the final
year's FMV\ is less than the prior year's estimated sales fig-
ure (Sx)
S89 + S90 + S91 + S92 + FMV - = TS
D. Future Losses
The difference between the artist's total estimated
sales (TS) and the collection's 1989 fair market value
(FMV.,) is the artist's future losses (FL).
Formula:
TS - FMV., = FL
E. Future Losses Without
Sales From the Gallery
For some artists whose works were consigned just
prior to the fire or for whom no specific gallery sales
records are available, the future loss computations
based on prior sales from a particular gallery cannot
be performed. FL for such artists can be calculated,
however, as long as there is some sales history for the
artist. For example, the average 1989 sales figure
(S89) for such artists could be derived from averaging
the number of works (N) in the collection at their
FMVh9 to reach an average price per work (AP) and
multiplying that figure by the average number of sales
(AS) per year that the artist has enjoyed over the
years. S89 can then be used to compute future losses
in the same manner discussed above.
Formula:
FBlVo +-N=APxAS=S89
Ill. Damages
Each artist's damages (D) should be the sum of
fair market value (FININ), plus future losses (FL).
Formula:
FAiIM's9 + FL = D
IV. Sample Calculations
The following calculations show how the dam-
ages for two different artists (Artist A and Artist B) are
established through the use of the formulae suggested
above. The calculations presume that both artists' esti-
mates of fair market value at the time of the fire and
currently are reliable. Artist A had a prior history of
sales with the gallery and a large collection in the
gallery at the time of the fire, while Artist B had no
sales history with the gallery and a small collection in
the gallery at the time of the fire.
Artist A Artist B
$69,800( FM V,) $1 1,600(FM V.)
$49,400(FMV.) = 1.1221291(A,) $ ( 1.1225733(A,)
Percentage of Annual Increase in Collection Values
Projected 1989 Sales
S87 = $ 3,225
S88 = $11,500
$3,225 x 1.1221291
= $3,618.87
$3,618.87 x 1.1221291
= $4,060.84 (S89a7)
$11,500 x. 1.1221291
= $12,904.49 (S89ss)
(($4,060.84 + $12,904.48)/2)
= $8,482.67 (S89)
S87 = 0
S88 = 0
(8,200/4) = 2,050 x 1
= 2,050
(given Artist's record of
selling one work per year
in comparable markets)
Estimated Damages Due
$49,400 (FMVsg) - $8,482.67
(S89) = $40,917.33 (I90)
e 1.1221291 = $45,914.54
(FMV90)
$45,914.54 (FMVg0) -
($8,482.66 -1.1221291
= $9,518.64 (S90)) =
$36,395.90 (91) o 1.1221291
= $40,840.90 (FMV9)
$40,840.90 (FMV9) -
($9,518.64 o 1.1221293 =
$10,681.14 (S91)) =
$33,843.12 (FMV2)
$33,843.12 (FMV92) -
($10,681.14 . 1.1221291
= $11,985.62 (S92)) =
$21,857.50 (93) * 1.122191
= $24,526.94 (FMV93)
$8,200 (FIV) -$2,050
(S89) = $6,150.00 (Igo)
x 1.1225733 =$6,903.83
(FIVlV90)
$6,903.83 (FMV9) -
($2,050.00 - 1.1225733
= $2,301.28 (S90)) =
$4,602.55 (9) e 1.1225733
= $5,166.70 (FIV1V91
$5,166.70 (FMVgi) -
($2,301.28 - 1.1225733
$30,159.74 (92) - 1.1221291
= $2,583.36 (S91)) =
$2,583.34 (92) * 1.1225733
= $2,899.99 (FMNIV92)
$2,899.99 (FMV92) -
($2,583.34 - 1.1225733
= $2,899.98 (S92)) =
$.01 (93) e 1.1225733
$.01 (FNIV93)
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$24,526.94 (FMV93) -
($11,985.62 - 1.1221291 =
$13,449.41 (S93)) =
$11,077.53 (4) * 1.1221291
$12,430.42 (FMV94)
$8,482.66 (S89) $2,050.00 (S89)
9,518.64 (S90) 2,301.28 (S90)
10,681.14 (S91) 2,583.36 (S91)
11,985.62 (S92) 2,899.98 (S92)
13,449.41 (S93) .01 (FMV9 3)
12,430.42 (FMVs9) $9,834.63 (TS = D)
$66,547.89 (TS = D) -8,200.00 (FMV89)
-49,400.00 (FMVsg) $1,634.63 (FL)
$17,147.89 (FL)
CONCLUSION
The April, 1989 River North gallery fire has creat-
ed both a challenge and an opportunity for the
Illinois courts. The challenge lies in streamlining and
standardizing the evidence required for establishing a
fair measure of damages for the galleries and artists
that lost artworks in the fire. The opportunity lies in
establishing precedents that will enable others whose
artworks are damaged or destroyed to evaluate simi-
lar, unfortunate losses. Hopefully, the analyses and
formulae offered in this article will assist the courts in
meeting both the challenge and opportunity, and the
galleries and artists in obtaining adequate redress.
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